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Abstract 
Telecommunication systems of electric power 
facilities play important role in data transmission, 
telemetry, remote control and communication. At the 
same time, these systems are the most sensitive to, 
and the least protected from, High Altitude 
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), compared to other 
important electric and electronic systems used in the 
electric power industry. This situation cannot be 
perceived as normal and thus calls for corresponding 
actions. Unfortunately, renowned technical means 
are often very expensive, and regardless of 
advertisement, claims they do not always ensure 
reliable HEMP-protection of telecommunication 
systems. An analysis of the situation for the problem 
is presented in this article. 
Keywords: Telecommunication systems; High 
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse; HEMP; Protection 
elements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse of a nuclear 
explosion (HEMP), which creates a pulse of electric field 
with the density of up to 50 kV/m at the ground surface, is 
a powerful affecting factor aimed at causing the country's 
infrastructure to be out of operation. Military leaders of 
various countries perceive HEMP as a very efficient and 
perspective type of non-lethal weapon. On the one hand, 
high efficiency of infrastructural impact is determined by 
the wide spread of microelectronic and microprocessor-
based equipment in all types of modern systems 
(primarily those of electric power industry), whereas on 
the other hand, this equipment is completely unprotected 
in civil sectors [1]. 
Among various systems used in the electric power 
industry, the telecommunication system, which includes 
data transceiving, telemetry, remote control and 
communication systems, features the highest level of 
susceptibility to HEMP. In fact, modern sophisticated 
electronic telecommunication equipment uses very low 
(compared to other electric systems used in the electric 
power industry) voltages (not exceeding 3.5 - 5V). Thus, 
it has a low level of insulation of all the input and output 
circuits. That is why usual EMC standard requirements to 
low-voltage electric and electronic equipment that 
stipulate (among other things) testing with high-voltage 
pulses (2 and 4 kV) are not applicable to 
telecommunication ports, if they are available in these 
devices. This provision is included in all the standards that 
stipulate these tests.  
Telecommunication channels of the electric power 
industry are used to transfer real-time data regarding 
emergency modes between digital protection relays, and 
to perform remote control of high-voltage circuit breakers 
that determine the status of electric grid. Thus, the 
relevance of HEMP-protection of telecommunication 
systems becomes obvious. 
In the majority of situations, the issue was resolved due to 
conversion from galvanic-coupled circuits and copper-
conductor cables to fiber-optics communication line 
(FOCL), nevertheless, the problem of protecting multiple 
microprocessor based terminal devices that convert 
electric signals into optical and vice versa is still relevant. 
However, there are electric power facilities, where 
telecommunication systems equipped with highly-
sensitive electronic devices with galvanic-coupled circuits 
are still employed. This surfaces a question regarding the 
modes of re-designing of such a system in order to 
improve the level of its protection from HEMP.  
There are some common measures to improve HEMP-
resistance of equipment. These do not depend on the 
selected mode of re-designing. Predominantly, these 
measures deal with upgrading of electronic equipment 
cabinets that provide efficient protection of internal 
equipment from electromagnetic emission. Additionally, 
they ensure protection and backup of the power supply 
system. These measures and the means of their adoption 
were discussed earlier [2]. This article discusses the 
technical means that protect data transmission channels. 
An obvious solution would be to equip the existing 
telecommunication equipment with optical links that 
consist of converters of incoming and outcoming electric 
signals into optical signals and vice versa, and to transfer 
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these signals between the converters via a fiber-optic 
cable. Various converters of electric signals into optical, 
and vice versa, suitable for telecommunication systems 
are readily available in the market (Fig. 1). Thus, the 
problem of protection of data transfer channels using 
these converters can easily be solved. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Various converters of electric signals into 
optical, and vice versa, suitable for 
telecommunication systems. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL WAYS AND 
ELEMENTS FOR PROTECTION THE EXISTING 
TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT WITH GALVANIC 
COUPLING VIA COPPER-CONDUCTOR CABLES 
It is more challenging to protect the existing 
telecommunication equipment with galvanic coupling via 
copper-conductor cables. Standard HEMP-protection 
(stipulated by standards and offered by multiple 
manufacturers) of this equipment is represented by special 
filters that efficiently suppress electric signals above a 
certain frequency level. However, [3] suggests that the use 
of special expensive filters to suppress a single short pulse 
lasting for parts of microseconds is absolutely 
unnecessary. Additionally, the frequency range of many 
modern communication and data transfer systems falls 
within the HEMP spectrum, which should be suppressed 
by these filters, whereas the filters themselves are often 
represented by low-voltage devices, which do not allow 
application of high-voltage pulses to their input. Thus, 
telecommunication equipment needs to be protected from 
the impact of high-voltage pulse only. 
There are devices incorporating the elements that 
significantly reduce their impedance in case of higher 
(compared to nominal) voltage applied to them. They 
protect electronic equipment from high voltage pulses and 
include: 
- Gas Discharge Tubes (GDT); 
- Metal Oxide Varistor (MOV); 
- Thyristor Surge Suppressor (TSS; Sidac); 
- Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS-diode). 
Comparison of the best in class (based on our survey) 
elements based on the aggregate of key parameters that 
make them appealing for use in telecommunication 
systems is provided in Table 1. 
Response time (reaction time) of the element is one of the 
most important indicators, which is rarely indicated in 
catalogs explicitly. This is connected with many reasons, 
in particular, with the dependence of this time on the 
speed of voltage pulse rise and on the shape and the 
length of leads of specific elements. If this time is 
indicated in catalogs, it does not make a lot of sense as the 
manufacturers often use the semi-product (in fact, they 
use the material, from which the element is manufactured 
without leadsand covering) to reduce it. Furthermore, the 
response time of the element in real circuits will depend 
on the parameters of a circuit that it is protecting. It is 
known, however, that TVS-diodes feature the best 
response time (several nanoseconds). 
Table 1. Some main parameters of protective 
elements of different kinds 
 
Parameter  \  
Kind (group) of 
element 
GDT MOV TSS 
TV
S 
Best type of 
element in the 
kind (group)  
2020-
15T 
V05E1
1P 
TISP 
4011H1
BJ 
S03-
6 
Max. Operating 
voltage, V 
- 11 5.25 6 
Min. Activation 
voltage, V 
60 
(650) 
18 10.5 6.8 
Residual 
(clamping) 
voltage, V 
52 36 3 15 
Max. Pulse 
power, W 
- - - 
280
0 
Max. Pulse 
current, A (2/10 
µs) 
4000 500 500 150 
Reaction time - - - - 
Capacitance 
between 
electrodes, pF 
2 1300 110 25 
They are followed by thyristor surge suppressors with 
their dozens of nanoseconds, followed by varistors with 
response time of several dozens of hundreds of 
nanoseconds. The last in this row are gas discharge tubes 
(GDT) with a response time of 0.2 – 0.5 ms (the rise time 
of the HEMP voltage pulse is several nanoseconds and 
length of the current pulse amounts to dozens - hundreds 
of nanoseconds). Other disadvantages of gas discharge 
tubes include high actuation voltage and residual voltage. 
Moreover, actuation (gas breakdown) voltage of the 
lowest-voltage gas discharge tubes increases sharply with 
the increase of steepness (decrease rise time) of applied 
voltage pulse.  
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Fig. 2. Circuit diagram of a device protecting 
Ethernet network from HEMP based on gas 
discharge tube (GDT) manufactured by MPE 
Company. 
For example, according to IEC 61643-311 [4], the 
minimum GDT’s discharge voltage rises from 75 V to 
650 V if the rate of applied voltage increase as 1 kV/µs. 
obviously, this value will be even higher for HEMP pulse 
with its high steepness (rate of increase). Now it becomes 
clear that GDTs themselves cannot ensure protection of 
electronic equipment from HEMP. 
Due to this, various HEMP-protection devices marketed 
by some manufacturers seem very weird as their main 
(and often the only) element protecting from over-voltage 
is represented by GDTs, Fig. 2. 
One of the manufacturers explain upon our request that 
they are aware that GDT cannot provide protection from 
HEMP, but it is preferable to use these imperfect 
protecting devices rather than not to use any at all. This 
proves that we should not rely on promotion brochures 
only. We need to conduct a thorough analysis of the 
internal structure of the offered device and the applied 
hardware components. 
 
Fig. 3. Design of electric circuit of one channel 
and actuation oscillogram of Series 3414 
protecting device manufactured by 
HUBER+SUHNER Company [6]. 
Varistors that are widely used in electric engineering are 
also not suitable for telecommunication systems, however, 
the reason is different: they are not suitable due to their 
high capacitance (for low-voltage elements). High 
capacitance connected to high-frequency circuits of 
telecommunication systems results in significant 
distortion and weakening of a useful signal. Thus, it is not 
acceptable to use high-capacitance protection elements in 
these systems. Table 2 shows maximum permissible 
capacitance values for various signals recommended in 
[5]. 
Gas discharge tubes feature the best parameters from the 
minimum capacitance point of view (i.e. minimum impact 
on the circuit being protected). This feature, combined 
with high switching capacity (discharge currents can reach 
several or even dozens of kiloamperes) does not allow the 
developers of protecting equipment to disregard them 
completely. Nevertheless, it is necessary to look for 
workarounds of using them to protect telecommunication 
equipment. 
Furthermore, according to many manufacturers of 
protecting devices, this workaround has been found. The 
idea was to combine high current, but a slow gas 
discharge tube, with a fast but low current suppressor 
(Fig. 3). 
However, this technical solution is rather puzzling. 
Transient voltage suppressors (TVS-diode in the diagram) 
are known to actuate (i.e. switch into conducting low 
impedance state upon increased voltage pulse impact) 
much quicker than gas discharge tubes (GDT in the circuit 
diagram). But upon the TVS suppressor’s actuation, the 
gas discharge tube will never actuate due to low residual 
voltage on open TVS. This voltage is not enough for gas 
breakdown in the GDT (minimum GDT breakdown 
voltage is about 60 V [4]). Lack of conditions for GDT 
actuation is also confirmed by an oscillogram, which 
clearly shows that the voltage in this circuit does not ever 
reach minimum voltage value necessary for GDT 
breakdown. 
Another attempt to solve the problem was made by 
introducing additional resistors into the circuit (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 4. A circuit diagram of compound two-stage 
protective device with additional resistors R 
The idea of the developers was that when high voltage 
pulse with high steepness of the leading edge arrives at 
the input of this device, the first one to actuate would be 
the TVS, which would limit the voltage amplitude of a 
device being protected. Furthermore, current flowing 
through it will result in the voltage drop on R resistors. 
The total voltage drop on resistors connected in series and 
the TVS suppressor should be sufficient for GDT 
breakdown. This will bypass the input of the device after 
its actuation and take the current off the TVS. Thus, 
developers expected the device to combine advantages of 
a TVS (fast response) with high switching capacity of a 
gas discharge tube, while the total capacitance of a device 
was expected to remain low. This design became very 
popular in many various types of protecting devices, 
manufactured by different companies (Fig. 5). 
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Similar designs with GDT in the first stage (sometimes 
with different non-crucial changes and additions) are used 
in many protecting devices, promoted as special HEMP-
protecting tools, such as those of Meteolabor and many 
other companies. But deeper analysis of the situation 
reveals hopelessness of this technical solution of a HEMP 
protector. This is connected with a short duration of 
HEMP voltage pulse (up to several dozens of 
nanoseconds). The action of this short pulse will finish 
prior to gas discharge of the tube's actuation. Thus, the 
GDT is not important and the lack, of or its availability, 
will not affect operation of the protective device. 
Some manufacturers use chokes instead of resistors in a 
diagram depicted in Fig. 4. The idea is to delay the 
process of voltage rise on a TVS suppressor; bring the 
moment of its actuation closer to origination of discharge 
in the gas discharge tube, and thus limit time for heavy 
current flow through the suppressor. These chokes, 
featuring high impedance for a short pulse, will also limit 
the amplitude of current flowing through the TVS. 
However, the problem is that these chokes will present 
significant attenuation into a useful high-frequency signal 
that falls into the megahertz range. Thus this idea is not 
very suitable for telecommunication equipment. 
 
Fig. 5. A sample of compound two-stage protective 
device designed as shown in Figure 4 manufactured by 
the industry. GDT – gas discharge tubes; R – resistors; 
TVS – transient voltage suppressor diode. 
Another problem, or more correct – a paradox, is the fact 
that various measures of equipment protection which 
weaken the HEMP’s impact will result in reduction of the 
HEMP’s pulse current amplitude. Comparatively long 
cables with copper cores of a small section used in 
telecommunication systems (i.e. with relatively high 
impedance) can additionally limit the HEMP’s current 
amplitude. When the current amplitude flowing through 
the TVS suppressor and low-resistance resistors R 
(resistance of several ohm) is not sufficiently high, the 
voltage drop on them may not achieve the value required 
for GDT breakdown, i.e. 650-700 V and higher (at high 
rate of voltage increase applied to the gas discharge tube 
at HEMP impact), while a wider (due to chokes’ 
inductance affect) current pulse will go through the 
suppressor causing thermal overload of its internal 
structure and even its destruction. 
Unfortunately, these debates cannot be either confirmed 
or contradicted with the figures due to the lack of real 
initial data about a HEMP pulse in each specific case and 
each specific location of equipment, the level of its 
protection, etc. Also, there are no data about the 
parameters of each copper couple of telecommunication 
system’s multicore cable running through different 
intermediate connections. However, a probability of 
unpredictable behavior of rather expensive devices, which 
are extensively promoted as a reliable means of protection 
conforming to MIL-STD-188-125, MIL-STD-461F 
standards, should alarm the specialists. At the same time, 
there is a question of how these devices have passed the 
conformity tests, if according to the above discussion they 
will not work as intended by their manufacturers. A 
deeper analysis reveals that there is a pitfall here as well. 
Indeed, manufacturers of these devices test them using a 
standard lightning current pulse of 8/20 milliseconds, 
instead of using a HEMP current pulse of 20/500 
nanoseconds, as prescribed by the standards, i.e. the test 
pulse is flatter and longer. As an excuse, manufacturers 
state [7] that it is very difficult to simulate a HEMP pulse, 
and in order to do so special expensive equipment is 
required. At the same time, generators of a standard 
lightning current pulse are readily available in the market 
and they are easy to use. Since the lightning current pulse 
is much wider than a HEMP pulse, its energy is even 
stronger than that of the HEMP pulse, thus it creates 
higher loads for a protecting device. Then they suggest [7] 
that if a device withstood the test with a more powerful 
lightning current pulse, it will definitely withstand the 
short HEMP pulse. But the advocates of this test method 
bashfully conceal that the behavior of a gas discharge tube 
under long and short pulse impact will be absolutely 
different. Gas discharge tubes are reliable under a rather 
long lightning current pulse featuring a relatively flat 
leading edge, whereas in case of a much shorter and 
steeper leading edge of a HEMP, they will not have 
sufficient time to actuate due to:  
- their natural “sluggishness”; 
- sharp increase of dielectric strength of gas 
contained in a GDT and consequently due to 
sharp increase of its breakdown voltage. 
III. THE NEW METHOD OF PROTECTION THE EXISTING 
TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 
In our opinion, a solution is to use simple, very cheap, 
non-recyclable, but predictable protecting devices, based 
on transient voltage suppressors (TVS-diodes) that feature 
all the parameters necessary for efficient protection of 
telecommunication systems, such as: fast response time, 
low capacitance and low actuation voltage. In case of a 
HEMP impact, the internal p-n-junction of a TVS will 
breakdown as it is affected by a high current pulse 
flowing through it, whereas the circuit that it protects will 
be bypassed (short-circuited). Given the fact that a HEMP 
event is extraordinary and a pulse is single, non-repeating, 
this algorithm of protecting the device’s operation is quite 
acceptable as it will protect the equipment from the 
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HEMP impact, and will allow it to return to operation by 
just disconnecting the damaged protecting device during 
the recovery period, which is inevitable in case of global 
HEMP impact. 
The only technical issue is to ensure selective action of 
the protecting device. In other words, TVS breakdown 
should occur under a HEMP impact only and not under 
the impact of other, weaker repeating overvoltage 
transients. 
This selectivity can be achieved primarily by selecting 
quite powerful TVS, and secondly by limiting the current 
flow through it by means of a resistor. Analysis of 
parameters of available TVS with actuation voltage and 
capacitance values suitable for telecommunication 
systems, revealed that S03-6 type TVS-diodes (Fig. 6) 
manufactured by Littelfuse (USA) are the most powerful 
among others. They are more powerful compared to the 
TVS of other manufacturers, with the same operating 
voltage and capacitance values and that allow flowing of 
pulse currents up to 150 A.  
One small chip like this protects a single twisted pair from 
HEMP of both common (in relation to the reference 
potential) and differential (between conductors) modes. 
The price of one element is about 2 US Dollars, however, 
in the case of wholesale purchase – less than 1 US Dollar. 
 
Fig. 6. Transient voltage suppressor diode (TVS) 
SP03-6 type. 
Resistance of a resistor connected with a suppressor in 
series (see a circuit diagram in Fig. 6, where the resistor is 
connected in series with each input) should be about 20 
Ohm, in order to limit the maximum permissible current 
pulse flowing through a suppressor in case the pulse 
transient interference with an amplitude of several 
kilovolts impacts the protecting device’s input. The 
current-limiting resistors should be non-inductive and 
should be intended for pulse current of the following 
types: AW, 234AS, RT818 and others. 
 
Fig. 7. A drawing of a printed circuit board of the 
offered protective device for 6 twisted pairs that 
includes TVS and current-limiting resistors. The 
circuit board should be coated with a high-
voltage varnish.  
This design of a protective device makes it very simple in 
terms of engineering (Fig. 7) and cheap. The same 
principle can be used to protect the inputs of sensitive 
equipment connected through a socket (Fig. 8). 
 
Fig. 8. An example of a simple protecting device 
for two twisted pairs (for E1 signal) and a 
diagram of one channel (for single pair) for 
circuits connected to the equipment via a socket. 
These simple devices can be produced by any 
manufacturer of printed circuit boards at a very affordable 
price. A range of Chinese companies will quickly produce 
the required quantity of these devices with excellent 
quality and at a minimal price. The latter is very important 
for civil branches of the electric power industry and 
production sector; as high cost of a HEMP protection is 
still a key factor that restrains practical adoption of such 
protection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the situation in the field of protecting devices 
and elements for telecommunication systems showed that 
expensive devices promoted by their manufacturers fail to 
provide reliable protection of highly sensitive equipment. 
It is recommended to use simple, cheap, non-recyclable 
devices that can be ordered individually by a consumer. 
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